Alternative Negotiators: Why It Is Important to Change the Negotiators Between Russia and Ukraine
By Abraham Mandelbaum
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and especially after its full-scale invasion in 2022, repeated diplomatic efforts, primarily between the U.S. and Russia, and to a lesser extent between the U.S. and Ukraine, have failed to produce a lasting peace.[1] For example, in 2025, President Vladimir Putin proposed a new round of ceasefire talks in Istanbul following the expiration of a unilateral three-day truce and renewed drone attacks on Kyiv.[2] European leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy rejected the proposal, insisting that any negotiations must begin with an unconditional ceasefire.[3] Since then, neither side has unconditionally surrendered.[4]
These efforts follow a long pattern of failed agreements.[5] Security assurances such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Treaty of Friendship were intended to safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty, but were undermined by Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.[6] Since 2022, the U.S. has repeatedly engaged Russia in ceasefire talks, but to no avail.[7] Each attempt at de-escalation has broken down.[8]
One of the main issues driving this dispute is the foundational conflict of interest between the warring countries.[9] Russia has demanded recognition of annexed territories, limits on Ukraine’s armed forces, and Ukrainian neutrality.[10] Ukraine views these conditions as existential red lines.[11] Many Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should continue to fight even without U.S. involvement.[12] Ukraine asserts that it will not cede any of the territory which Russia has conquered thus far.[13] They also require security guarantees to ensure Russia does not invade in the future.[14] However, Russia has said that they also need security guarantees.[15] They have sustained massive casualties acquiring these territories,[16] and as early as 2022, Putin has said that the areas which he has conquered clearly agreed to be part of Russia.[17] Additionally, NATO has pledged Ukraine membership since 2008, which Russia says must be rescinded.[18] In the past, when Finland joined NATO, Russia threatened countermeasures,[19] so it is likely Russia would do the same if Ukraine joined NATO.
While negotiations have not been meritorious, there may be alternative methods in the search for peace. One of the central issues in any mediation is who the mediator is and if both sides trust the mediator.[20] Russia and Ukraine have heavily relied on the U.S. to negotiate between themselves,[21] but Russia and the U.S. have a tenuous relationship at best.[22] This stems from when Russia (then the Soviet Union) was in a Cold War with the United States for decades.[23] To date in 2026, Russia and the United States have spent longer involved in a Cold War than post one.[24] Ukraine has also expressed frustration with the U.S.[25] Because of these factors, negotiating with the United States can be very tricky.
In order to solve this issue, a tri-partite panel should be implemented.[26] Rather than negotiating directly, Russia and Ukraine would each appoint a proxy state to represent their interests—a state which is ideologically aligned but capable of objective diplomacy. Russia should choose a spokesperson who is ideologically aligned with them, yet still militarily involved in the conflict. For Russia, Belarus is a likely candidate, given its military alignment,[27] close diplomatic ties[28] and shared border.[29] For Ukraine, Poland serves as a natural counterpart. Poland shares cultural similarities with Ukraine,[30] has welcomed millions of Ukrainian refugees,[31] and has a strong vested interest in regional stability.[32]
The two representative countries would then choose a third, neutral, party who would preside over the negotiations, break deadlocks, and facilitate a binding diplomatic consensus. This would allow both parties to feel that they are being adequately represented and enable negotiations to progress more efficiently.
_____________________
[1] See Matthew Ward Agius, An Elusive Peace: Charting Ceasefire Attempts in Ukraine, DW Conflicts I Ukraine (May 15, 2025), https://www.dw.com/en/an-elusive-peace-charting-ceasefire-attempts-in-ukraine/a-72509759 [https://perma.cc/V2NH-K8PW].
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] See Ukraine War Briefing: Conflict Could End if Russia Economically or Militarily ‘Exhausted’, Says Germany’s Merz, Guardian (Feb. 13, 2026), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/14/ukraine-war-briefing-conflict-could-end-if-russia-economically-or-militarily-exhausted-says-germanys-merz [https://perma.cc/MG7Z-BV6F].
[5] See Agius, supra note 1.
[6] Id.
[7] See id.
[8] See id.
[9] See Vitallii Rishko, Bound to Fail? The Limits of Diplomacy in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Future of European Security, Glob. Governance Ins. (Apr. 8, 2025), https://www.globalgovernance.eu/publications/bound-to-fail-the-limits-of-diplomacy-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-the-future-of-european-security [https://perma.cc/29VY-JMBY].
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Zelenskyy: Ukraine Will Not Give Up Territory to Russia, Even in Peace Plan Talks, CBS News (Aug. 16, 2025), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/zelenskyy-ukraine-will-not-give-up-territory-russia-peace-plan-us [https://perma.cc/QV7L-JQDA].
[14] See Yevhen Kizilov, Security Guarantees: Zelenskyy Says Size and Functions of Foreign Deterrence Contingent in Ukraine are Almost Agreed, Pravda (Feb. 14, 2026), https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/01/07/8015047/ [https://perma.cc/59WP-KJCN].
[15] See News Agencies, Russia Says Talks on Ukraine Security Guarantees Must Include Moscow, Al Jazeera (Aug. 20, 2025), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/20/russia-says-ukraine-security-guarantees-talks-must-include-moscow [https://perma.cc/4PNT-8AEV].
[16] Pjotr Sauer, Russian and Ukrainian Military Casualties in War Nearing 2m, Study Finds, Guardian (Jan. 28, 2026), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/28/russia-ukraine-military-casualties-war-study [https://perma.cc/S86P-QMWL].
[17] Jon Gambrell & Hanna Ahrhirova, Putin Annexes Ukrainian Regions, Vows to Use ‘All Means’ to Protect Territories, Times of Isr. (Sep. 30, 2022), https://www.timesofisrael.com/putin-annexes-ukrainian-regions-vows-to-use-all-means-to-protect-territories/ [https://perma.cc/SB4J-WG9T].
[18] See Dmitry Antonov & Guy Faulconbridge, Russia Says NATO States Can't Enforce Ukraine Peace, Wants Membership Pledge Scrapped, Reuters (Feb. 18, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-nato-must-disavow-2008-membership-promise-ukraine-2025-02-18/ [https://perma.cc/AJ6Q-8SHM].
[19] Agence France-Presse, As Finland Becomes 31st NATO Member, Russia Warns of Countermeasures, NDTV (Apr. 4, 2023), https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/as-finland-becomes-31st-nato-member-russia-warns-of-countermeasures-3920173 [https://perma.cc/78UR-BMAK].
[20] Rusty Grant, Trust During the Mediation Process, Miles Mediation & Arb. (Apr. 19, 2025) https://milesmediation.com/blog/trust-during-the-mediation-process/ [https://perma.cc/G54T-ZV6Q].
[21] See Agius, supra note 1 (detailing many negotiations that primarily featured the U.S.).
[22] See Simon Saradzhyan, US Intelligence Chiefs Stick to View of Russia as Adversary, Davis Ctr. for Russian & Eurasian Stud., Harv. Univ. (Mar. 27, 2025), https://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/insights/us-intelligence-chiefs-stick-view-russia-adversary [https://perma.cc/JZA8-HVSP].
[23] The Cold War, Gilder Lehrman Ins. of Am. Hist., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/collection/panel-exhibitions/cold-war [https://perma.cc/J2L3-58VH].
[24] See id.
[25] John T Psaropoulos, Ukraine’s Patience with US Peace Push Wears Thin as Russia Skirts Pressure, Al Jazeera (Feb. 20, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/2/20/ukraines-patience-with-us-peace-push-wears-thin-as-russia-skirts-pressure [https://perma.cc/EPT3-8FF5].
[26] See Arbitration Panels: Advantages and Disadvantages, ADR Times (Oct. 25, 2021), https://adrtimes.com/arbitration-panels/ [https://perma.cc/RM6F-ZJYA] (“The usual manner of selecting a tripartite panel is that each party appoints one arbitrator and those two arbitrators select a third, who is usually the chairperson of the panel.”).
[27] See Jack Roush, Russia’s War in Ukraine Has Brought Iran and Belarus Closer Together, War on Rocks (Feb. 17, 2025), https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/russias-war-in-ukraine-has-brought-iran-and-belarus-closer-together/ [https://perma.cc/W2F2-S7UB].
[28] See BNE IntelliNews, Belarus Now ‘Untouchable’ Under Russia’s Nuclear Umbrella, Lukashenko Says, Moscow Times (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/04/14/belarus-now-untouchable
-under-russias-nuclear-umbrella-lukashenko-says-a88729 [https://perma.cc/HXS3-X8GS].
[29] See From Russia to Belarus: Crossing the Border, RailRussia, https://www.railrussia.com/belorussianborder [https://perma.cc/WN2U-N2LF] (last visited Feb. 22, 2026).
[30] Poland and Poles as Seen by Ukrainians 2024, Mieroszewski Cnt. (2024), https://mieroszewski.pl/en/knowledge/public-opinion-research/poland-and-poles-as-seen-by-ukrainians-2024 [https://perma.cc/23DN-DK85].
[31] Number of Ukrainian Refugees Crossing Into Poland 2022–2025, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293228/poland-ukrainian-refugees-crossing-the-polish-border/ [https://perma.cc/W6K8-YVS5] (last visited Feb. 16, 2026).
[32] See Poland Adds Checkpoints at Border with Ukraine to Critical Infrastructure List, Interfax (Jan. 29, 2025), https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/109448/ [https://perma.cc/2A9R-XQFG].
